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In addition to showing how politically oriented Flann O’Brien’s At Swim-Two-Birds 
remains despite its playful exterior, this essay constitutes an extended reflection on issues of 
power and agency within the postcolonial Irish context. It demonstrates that Irish iden-
tity is constructed and controlled via a god-like architecture of temporal and discursive 
surveillance. Second, it argues for an agency that does not simply place the subaltern in 
a new tower, but for one that displaces the panoptical structure. Such a displacement is 
grounded in a mortal agency, an agency that does not recreate god-like Cartesian subjects, 
but emphasizes proximity and relation to one another. O’Brien’s text — full as it is of 
strange and disparate odds and ends — becomes the ultimate exemplar of this relation.
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While Flann O’Brien’s At Swim-Two-Birds may be especially renowned for its humor and postmodern play, its comedy and experimentation should be understood as an incisive political response to the oppressive 
gaze of another. This gaze is unmistakably indicated in O’Brien’s discarded titles, 
Through the Angel ’s Eyelid and Task-Master’s Eye (Cronin 87). At Swim testifies 
to the particular problems of Ireland in the 1930s and deserves to be read as an 
incisive analysis of “soft” colonial oppression — the ideological control that oper-
ates through England’s books and publishing houses. I argue that colonial power 
is sustained most crucially through a god-like surveillance which governs the 
temporal and, more importantly, the discursive world of the colonized. While the 
text offers some traditional agential options to this control, it also puts forward 
what some might very well consider a non-agency — or conversely, an “agency” 
grounded in mortality.
Between conversations with friends and fierce confrontations with his uncle, 
At Swim’s unnamed narrator pieces together a novel about Dermot Trellis, who 
also happens to be a novelist. The latter is writing a novel whose characters then 
rebel against him in a manner parallel with the narrator’s familial rebellion. As 
his name suggests, Trellis links all the disparate parts of the novel. We see Trellis’s 
panoptic position when he “compel[s] his characters to live with him in the Red 
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Swan Hotel so that he can keep an eye on them” (47, 86, 139; my emphasis). As 
with Foucault’s plague-stricken town, “Each individual is fixed in his place. And, 
if he moves, he does so at the risk of his life, contagion or punishment” (Discipline 
195). The Red Swan Hotel simultaneously recalls Shakespeare as the Swan of 
Avon, Shakespeare’s unique literary production which mirrors Trellis’s own genius 
for creating characters, and the traditional linkage of Great Britain with the color 
red (O’Brien 34, 54). At several points, Trellis’s eyes are described as “sentries in red 
watchtowers” that collect “intelligence” (248, 238). In this one image of a writer in 
a watchtower, O’Brien brings together two concepts, time and surveillance, which 
will be crucial to what follows.
Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon — to which Foucault’s work owes much — con-
sists of a tower surrounded by cells within which prisoners are clearly visible in 
any position and at all times. One of the most crucial elements of Bentham’s tower 
was the addition of blinds. By adding blinds to the tower, the prisoners are never 
certain if they are being watched. The guard mimics omniscience, but also invis-
ibility. The disembodied guard becomes god-like. The blinds create a sense in the 
prisoners of constantly being watched when in fact that is impossible. “Hence,” 
Foucault writes in Discipline and Punish, “the major effect of the Panopticon: to 
induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the 
automatic functioning of power” (201). O’Brien deals with this panoptic power 
structure at several levels in his text. At various moments, it becomes clear that 
Trellis as well as Ronan, and, finally, the Good Fairy all inhabit the tower. For the 
moment, I hope simply to show how discursive control is bound up in Trellis’s 
god-like position-taking.
Trellis’s Shakespeare-like power is not limited to surveillance but is also dis-
cursive. His connection with Shakespeare reminds us of canonical authors’ role in 
propagating “colonial images and ideals” throughout the empire (Boehmer 14). 
His didactic novel-in-progress on societal sins both affirms the political order and 
discursively writes Irish subjectivity. In league with the status quo, Trellis is part of 
Foucault’s disciplining regime whose ultimate goal, maximum economic produc-
tivity, depends on education and the improvement of “public morality” (Discipline 
208). Early on the narrator, while informing a friend of his artistic principles, states 
that a “novel, in the hands of an unscrupulous writer, could be despotic” (33). The 
novel he envisions would be a “self-evident sham” in which characters were not 
forced to be “uniformly good or bad.” Characters should, he says, possess a “private 
life, self-determination, and a decent standard of living.” Of course, Trellis’s art 
restricts free will and his exclusive preference for books with green binding marks 
him out as an “orientalist” intent on constructing Ireland.
O’Brien almost obsessively disliked publishers and biographers, especially “the 
type of biography that lifts the veil, hacks down the elaborate facades one has spent 
a lifetime in erecting — that is horrible” (Clissman 3). He saw capitalism as central 
to the question of representation. Once the Irish made the move from savage to 
quaint in the minds of the British public, the “snake-like eye of London publishers” 
began compelling Irish writers to “play . . . up to the foreigner, putting up the witty 
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celtic act” (qtd. in Esty 29). Publishing perpetuates British hegemony through the 
reproduction of stereotypes. Trellis, then, serves as a representation of hegemonic 
publishing practices grounded in England. As such, his novel will make money, 
improve public morality (while titillating his readers), and continue the discursive 
construction of Irish identity — all part of the colonial package.
Ultimately, Trellis’s discursive power needs to be understood as grounded 
in his panoptical position: only someone at such a height and with such critical 
distance may presume to rationalize a world of otherness. Foucault writes of how 
surveillance and writing are inextricably connected:
This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are 
inserted in a fixed place, in which the slight movements are supervised, in which all 
events are recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and 
periphery . . . all this constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism. 
(Discipline 197; my emphasis)
Fixity is essential to a Cartesian subject’s identity as it implies that things do not 
change and, therefore, should not be questioned. This passage describes the complex 
manner in which information gleaned from sight and organized through writing 
substantiates a status quo, fixed reality. The narrator’s desire for a more democratic 
novel would begin when this god-like rationalization and fixity are seen for the 
shams they are, that is, totally arbitrary. Returning to Trellis’s description as a sentry 
in a red watchtower, here are the first sensations of one of his literary/discursive 
creations. Please note the linkage among discourse, panoptical vision, and time:
He heard the measured beat of a good quality time-piece coming from the center of the 
cloud and then the form of a chamber-pot was evidenced to his gaze, hanging without 
support and invested with a pallid and indeed ghostly aspect . . . A voice came from 
the interior of the cloud.
Are you there, Furriskey? it asked. Furriskey experienced the emotion of fear which 
distorted for a time the character of his face. (68; my emphasis)
This scene, with Furriskey’s fear of the voice emanating from the cloud, echoes 
God’s address to Moses in Exodus (19:9). Furriskey’s first moments of life are 
described as “bewilder[ing]” as he is “consumed by doubts as to his own identity” 
(57–59). He resolves these doubts only through the “sensory perception of his ten 
fingers” on his face (which Trellis has written on in Braille). Lamont, an employee 
of Trellis, “. . . was [then] kind enough to produce his costly fifteen-jewel hunter 
watch and permit Mr. Furriskey to appraise the character of his countenance on 
the polish of its inner lid” (72–73). In a very basic way, what one sees here is a 
newborn who finds his identity by fitting into the temporal and discursive catego-
ries — Bentham’s cells — created by an oppressive other, Trellis, and everything he 
represents.
Temporality is a subset of writing, understood in a general post-structuralist 
sense, insofar as it also is a means of ordering or dispelling otherness. Having said 
that, consider the way in which temporality was viewed in the historical context 
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of the novel. This will allow us better to consider the interconnectedness of time, 
technology, and British hegemony. Relational time — the idea of time as related 
to events such as birth and death — was the traditional view for centuries. British 
industrial ascendancy, however, prompted the evolution of time as a “conceptual 
tool designed to fill various practical purposes” (Lundmark 45; O’Brien 42). Telling 
time in relation to the sun began dying out in large cities as the public increasingly 
switched to clocks and absolute time. Absolute time — time that exists separate 
from a relation to events as theorized by Isaac Newton — was required as a refer-
ence point (in addition to absolute space) to specify the movements of forces in 
nature. Soon the use of clocks became “common-sense,” and was needed for such 
things as train schedules (57–59). In England there was some rancor, especially in 
the west, over the implementation of Standard Time. Clergy in other parts of the 
world argued that there was such a thing as “God’s time” and that Standard Time 
was an “abomination.” Standard Time was quickly linked with the loss of tradi-
tional values and with the growing power of railroads. When Germany ushered in 
Daylight Savings Time in 1916, other industrialized nations swiftly followed suit 
out of war-time fear (60–62).
According to Lennart Lundmark, time should be understood as an “attempt 
. . . to order a surrounding reality filled with a confusing multitude of events” (62). 
Time becomes a means of subject formation as subjectivity necessarily becomes 
more coherent as relation is dispelled. The earlier trope of the clock within the 
cloud then symbolizes the displacement of relation by a mechanized, alienated, 
and industrial nationalism as seen in Britain’s colonial practices. Within the biblical 
cloud and at the hands of Trellis, Furriskey’s creation occurs in/on British time, a 
time born of a practical purpose as Foucault testified, both economic and subject-
forming. Trellis’s psycho-eugenic creation of Furriskey, for example, conforms to 
the cartoon caricature of the ape-like Irishman, but with an interesting difference: 
Furriskey bears a marked aptitude for mathematics, indicating Trellis’s preference 
for a “living mammal” who can navigate industrial society (O’Brien 55). Like the 
clock that sits on the window ledge in Trellis’s room, absolute time asks for “servile” 
human clocks whose “twin alarming gongs could be found if looked for behind the 
dust-laden books on the mantelpiece” (42).
Britain, as manifested in Trellis, creates an “order” through time that stabi-
lizes the colonial chaos surrounding the colonial elite (Lundmark 62). The clock 
within the cloud, which had once signified the time to be in relation with God 
and others, subverts relation through its creation of arbitrary temporal borders. The 
colonial power supplants “God’s time” for its own purposes, only to inscribe itself 
and absolute time into a relational world vis-à-vis Ireland. But this is probably a 
bit too simple: It is more accurate to say that relation, itself, has been supplanted. 
Inserting a clock in the place of God, a clock that never responds to others around 
it but ticks on mindlessly, interpolating others to its schema, should not by any 
means be understood as a relation.
In a panoptic sense, God’s (relational) surveillance has been usurped by an 
equally ubiquitous technology of surveillance, entangling the colonial subject in 
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an impenetrable web. Such surveillance reproduces divine omniscience within an 
architectural (or technological) framework in which the human gazer is unseen, 
hidden high above, but always assumed to be present, ensuring obedience. With 
the common religious justification for colonization in mind, industry’s metaphori-
cal supplanting of religion takes on particular poignancy. Ireland tells its time and 
has its being in (non)relation to England. Furriskey enters history only through 
the colonial mirror, the watch that Lamont provides, becoming whole and coordi-
nated, and attaining the germs of identity. The colonial subject receives wholeness 
while the colonial power, concomitantly, orders the reality in which the subject is 
constituted.
In the latter portion of the novel when Orlick, Trellis’s son through rape, plots 
his father’s torture, judgment, and death, he adopts the master’s weapon, writing. 
Soon Orlick is disturbing the “flight of time” and bursting Trellis’s eyeball (254–56). 
Orlick even writes Furriskey, Shanahan, and Lamont into their own panopticon. 
Written in as judges, they assume an elevated position in the courtroom where 
the machinations of an unjust legal system are obscured (294). Trellis becomes 
the defendant and a victim of the most excruciating tortures, showing explicitly 
how the creation of identity from without instead of from within is a torturous 
experience. The characters appear to understand the source of Trellis’s power, but, 
unfortunately, this awareness does not lead to a more sophisticated politics. Their 
projection of a new identity continues to rely on the tainted coordinates of their 
stereotyped identities (Fanon 94–95). When they are not Irish stereotypes, they are 
mimic men. Leaving one stereotype leads them inevitably to the opposite stereo-
type, logically possessed by the colonial power — an identity created spontaneously 
from the colonial power’s effort to define the Irish as “other.” The Irish can know 
themselves only in and through the aid of the other.
As the text makes clear, Trellis is the narrator’s uncle. The narrator’s rebel-
lion against Trellis is encapsulated in the creation of a novel of supposedly self-
determining characters (O’Brien 33). If the “entire corpus” of literature could be 
available for authors and, by extension, readers, to choose characters (or identities), 
the unconscious reliance on essentialized notions of identity could end, he argues. 
The “despotic” author (or jailer) would be no more. The text would no longer 
naively represent reality, but would ostentatiously point to the arbitrariness of 
artistic creation, and, in true postmodern fashion, to the arbitrariness of reality. In 
the context of O’Brien’s analysis, the narrator has stumbled upon a potent weapon. 
Unfortunately, the narrator ultimately fails to carry through because, as he wittily 
remarks in a pub, “the conclusion of your syllogism . . . is fallacious being based 
on licensed premises” (26). Here, however, in writing, the narrator does not realize 
that the premises on which identity — his own identity as a kept student — is based 
are also licensed. It is much easier to theorize post-identity than to live its reality. 
While the narrator writes of a coup in the king’s court, his writing is intimately 
related, licensed, to his actual life. As Orlick’s writing progresses, Trellis appears 
doomed, until the narrator receives the uncle’s gift of reconciliation, a watch, as 
reward for his college success.
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As the narrator leaves his uncle, the Angelus sounds in the background (312). 
Thomas Shea indicates that an early draft had the bell sounding from At Swim-
Two-Birds, the place of Sweeny’s original conversion (76). Etymologically, the 
“Angelus” links religion (Angel) and England (Anglo-Saxon) with colonial surveil-
lance. Bells ring several times in the book, calling the idle back to their duties, and to 
their time schedules (45, 62, 143). While O’Brien’s deletion of Sweeny’s conversion 
at At Swim-Two-Birds signifies the validity of Sweeny’s protest against the church 
(and the colonial power behind the church), the narrator’s acceptance of the watch 
and the simultaneous sounding of the bell signal his failure: his writing and sloth 
never radically destabilize the system. Consequently, the narrator’s writing turns 
conservative. He has Trellis’s maid burn the pages that contain the latter’s story. 
This destroys the fiction that created Orlick and frees Trellis to return, shaken, to 
his room where he implies that he will be doing much less writing in the future 
(313). Between the dense imagery of the watch, bell, and leniency toward Trellis, the 
narrator’s subjection is complete, acting as a tidy lesson in colonial power tactics.
* * *
Oppression and attempts at agency are enacted on each level of the novel, but 
perhaps nowhere more intriguingly than in the case of Sweeny, who is ultimately 
able to insert himself into the panoptic position. Finn MacCool is speaking of 
Sweeny and himself when he berates the writers of the world — who, I am argu-
ing, are part of the disciplining power — for their treatment of Ireland: “Who but 
a story-teller would dishonour [me]?” (O’Brien 25). Finn then relates the tale of 
Sweeny’s fall from the throne Dal Araidhe into “madness.” It all begins when he 
hears a priest, Ronan, “taping out the wall-steads” for a new church and ringing 
his bell on Sweeny’s “territory,” as another translation informs us (O’Brien 90–92; 
O’Keeffe 3). In a frenzy, Sweeny rushes out of his home, attacks the priest, throws 
the priest’s psalter into a lake, and then attempts to douse the priest. Ronan is given 
a reprieve when a message arrives for Sweeny from the front.
Ronan is praised as “generous,” “friendly,” and as a “shield against evil” two 
short paragraphs before the messenger’s interruption is described as an “evil des-
tiny.” In the space of a few sentences Ronan curses Sweeny and engages in “joy-
ous piety.” J.G. O’Keeffe’s and Seamus Heaney’s translations include neither the 
phrase “evil destiny” nor anything similar. Nor is there any indication that Sweeny 
will drown Ronan as he drags him through the church (O’Keeffe 5; Heaney 4). 
Heaney notes that “the literary imagination which fastened upon [Sweeny] as an 
image was clearly in the grip of a tension between the newly dominant Christian 
ethos and the older, recalcitrant Celtic temperament” (“Introduction”). O’Brien’s 
divergences from Heaney and O’Keeffe’s more straightforward translations fore-
ground this post-colonial reading in which England and the church are wed. Ronan 
is also a “story-teller” who, like Trellis and every competent tale-teller, carries his 
book (psalter) with him. With the omnipresence of God in the background, the 
construction of a church on what was Sweeny’s territory may be understood as a 
prototypical panopticon.
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Later, after Sweeny injures one of Ronan’s psalmists and breaks his “holy bell” 
with a spear during a temporary truce, the priest again curses the king (O’Brien 
91). So powerful is the combination of these curses that when the battle begins, 
Sweeny “was beleaguered by an anger and a darkness, and fury . . . and with a disgust 
for the places that he knew” (92). Sweeny recognizes the disciplining nature of the 
church’s construction but is powerless against the discursive power of the Word. 
Like Nebuchadnezzar, Sweeny wanders the land, eating “green-topped water-
cress” and competing with other madmen over Glen Bolcain’s “fine couches” (94). 
Eventually, he grows feathers, an incarnation of the wild goose, or Irish exile motif 
(117). Though as a rule successful in escaping society’s attempt to entrap him, when 
captured, Sweeny is “hand-cuff[ed]” and “manacl[ed]” like an anarchist (97–98). 
He is constantly “besieged” by the disciplining officials of family and church who 
are intent on discursively capturing him:
 Your arrival here is surely welcome, Sweeny, he [Saint Moling] said, for it is destined 
that you should end your life here, and leave the story of your history here and be buried 
in the churchyard beyant . . . you will come to me each evening the way I can write 
your story. (125)
“Idleness is rebellion,” Foucault writes in Madness and Civilization (56). Sweeny’s 
insanity was solely the madness of the excluded. Sweeny was mad only insofar as 
he rejected the growing ethos of Christianity; his idleness, for that reason, was a 
definitive protest against the world’s rigid temporality. Engaged in the construction 
of a church, Ronan symbolizes not simply the new “Christian ethos,” industry, and 
colonial practices, but also the fallen state of humanity and of Ireland. Foucault 
writes, “If it is true that labor is not inscribed among the laws of nature, it is envel-
oped in the order of the fallen world” (Madness 56). Sweeny’s action marks him as a 
representative of the pre-fallen world. Naked, angry, and clearly idle before Ronan, 
Sweeny is in the perfect position to be labeled mad, for Ronan’s curse is the nam-
ing (or writing) of a condition. It would be difficult to put it more elegantly than 
Shanahan: “There was a curse — a malediction — put down in the book against him. 
The upshot is that your man becomes a bloody bird” (118; my emphasis).
As Foucault argues, the act of defining madness is a means of control (Madness 
35). In the classical age, the church, allied with government, used “confinement” or 
prisons to dominate society, eliminating public “agitation” and unemployment (54). 
Often it was not the insane alone who endured the close spaces of such places as 
the Hôpital Général in Paris, but also “those condemned by common law, young 
men who disturbed their families’ peace or who squandered their goods, people 
without profession” (45). Interestingly, the first such hospitals in England origi-
nated in the country’s most industrialized cities, places like Worcester and Bristol, 
where patients would frequently work (51). The condition Ronan dictates has as 
much to do with controlling and monitoring Sweeny’s otherness as it has to do 
with his “insanity.”
Along with Sweeny’s rejection of labor and responsibility, Sweeny threatens 
the panoptical architecture of colonialism in a more direct way. When the party 
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led by the Pooka and the Good Fairy stumble upon Sweeny, the latter immediately 
accuses Sweeny of drunkenness (181–83). But Sweeny is sober enough to speak 
to them in verse:
Though my flittings are unnumbered,
My clothing to-day is scarce,
I personally maintain my watch
On the tops of mountains. (my emphasis)
Not only does Sweeny never sleep or work, he makes his home in trees and watches 
“on the tops of mountains.” Such is his threat that the invisible Good Fairy — the 
epitome of omniscience and omnipresence — tells the others to “Put green moss 
in his mouth . . . are we going to spend the rest of our lives in this place listening 
to talk the like of that?” It is his positioning, his idleness, and his story telling that 
together threaten, but do not endanger the system that substantiates the fairy’s 
identity and position in the panopticon.
Moments of agency within the text typically reproduce binary oppositions, 
instigating violence for violence as everyone tries to place themselves in the place 
of divinity. Orlick, for example, makes Trellis relive his torture and Sweeny places 
himself squarely in the panoptical position. Such agency does little to displace the 
system of oppression. Arguably, such agential oppositions augment the system. If 
agency is commonly understood as the substantiation of an oppressed subjectivity 
against an oppressive subjectivity, O’Brien’s text ultimately rejects such a view.
* * *
A more nuanced agency does not appear until the Pooka MacPhellimey, a devil 
out of Irish folklore, confronts the Good Fairy (171). While O’Brien changed the 
fairy’s name from “Angel” to evade possible trouble with the church, references 
to its angelic nature remain (149, 156, 160). The fairy is invisible and all-seeing 
(160). Allied with the Trellis cohort, the Good Fairy exemplifies the panopticon 
whose efficacy relies on the illusion of omniscience. Just as the fairy represents the 
church, England (Anglo-Saxon), and surveillance, the pooka, as a “devil,” stands in 
for the opposite traits (as long as this opposition is not understood as an opposi-
tion of the same at an essential level). In their first encounter the fairy remarks 
that “I could see through my eye-lids if I shut my eyes” (160). The pooka, naturally, 
deliberately abstains from “an exhaustive exercise of . . . vision” (147). This question 
of surveillance is immediately tied to industry when the fairy materializes in the 
pooka’s coat pocket, a coat “made in the old days” before “cheap factory-machined 
clothing” (160–61). The pooka explains that Good Fairy will not be able to see 
through this material because “there is better stuff in that coat . . . than was ever 
in any angel’s eye-lid.”
In fact, some of those present at the poker game in which Orlick’s fate for 
good (the fairy) or evil (the pooka) is decided attempt to exclude the fairy precisely 
because it has “no face.” The pooka responds:
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The charge of cheating or defaulting at cards is a vile one and a charge that cannot be 
lightly leveled in the present company. In every civilized community it is necessary 
that the persons comprising it shall accept one another at their face value as honest 
men until the contrary is proved . . .
 Take the cards if you want them, snapped Shorty, and talk about face value, that 
fellow has no face. By God, it’s a poor man that hasn’t that much. (199)
Shorty correctly surmises that playing any “game,” whether of poker, publishing, 
politics, or business, with a faceless character who can easily see your cards is fool-
hardy. He suggests that humanity, as opposed to divinity, is embodied in a face. 
While the Good Fairy does not materialize into a “face,” for the pooka he does 
possess a “face value.” And it is the nature of this face value that allows us to locate 
the most radical moment of “agency” in O’Brien’s novel.
Agency is indicated primarily through the blurring of the eye of the fairy, who 
is, once again, within the dark confines of the pooka’s coat pocket: “The light is 
very bad in here, said the Good Fairy, I can hardly see my cards at all” (200). Soon, 
the fairy’s hearing fades and ultimately the fairy — who never loses — finds himself 
bested by the pooka. The importance of this win cannot be understated. Since the 
fairy has no money, he has to give up his right to influence the newborn Orlick 
for heaven, freeing the pooka to work his will (204). This sets up Orlick’s eventual 
revolt against Trellis which — though an agential failure ultimately for the above 
reasons — alarms him enough that he takes a break from his writing.
Unlike the moment described above in which Sweeny takes up a panopti-
cal position on a mountain, everyone who is participating in the poker game is 
restricted to the local, particular level of mortal humans. Agency — ultimately 
found in the displacement of the entire panoptic system — then can be understood 
first of all as a product of positioning. The fairy’s position in the pooka’s pocket 
makes it an equal part of the poker circle. The fairy is no longer outside, above, or 
impossible to place, and this disables its divine power. This could be understood as 
a movement from invisibility to embodiment as the Good Fairy is now on parade 
for all to “see” — weak, mortal, blind. Additionally, we should remember that the 
poker game is bounded by Orlick’s incipient birth. In the body of Orlick we must 
“recognize” the sightless, mortal beings that we all are.
I have been at pains to show how a particular panoptical positioning on the 
part of British publishing firms is the foundation for discursive control. At this 
particular moment when the tower has not so much been taken as dismantled, 
it should be no surprise that someone tells a story. The pooka relates an old Irish 
legend in which “Dermot” (i.e., Trellis, though, yes, a different character) steals 
Finn MacCool’s “woman,” Granya. The pooka tells how Dermot and Granya take 
shelter in his cave and then how Dermot and he play a game of chess for Granya. 
The pooka’s eventual checkmate of Dermot coincides with his “checkmate” of the 
fairy at cards.
While previously the fairy had attempted to stop Sweeny’s tale-telling, here 
the Good Fairy is, if not muted, at least quieted (183). The telling of “authentic” 
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Irish stories is a response to the oppressive and one-sided telling of the Irish story 
from the point of view of the colonizer. It is no accident that the pooka’s story 
reinserts Dermot (“Trellis”) into an Irish story in which the latter, a figure for 
England, loses to the Irish. Writing back to empire in the context of the narrator’s 
theory of writing described earlier makes colonial assimilation of the other both 
more difficult and more labored. I would like to emphasize within the context of the 
central image of power in the text — the panoptical position of the colonizer — that 
this story telling is not universal, but finite and limited. The position within the 
circle indicates that any story must necessarily remain finite and will not be able 
to assimilate the world and its others to a simple authoritative narrative. A tower 
guard is distant and, therefore, out of relation with the others below. Here, the two 
parties are thrown closely together. It is messy, a little tense, but there is relation 
and no unfair advantage.
Novels typically yearn for coherence, for wholeness, and, above all, for an 
oppressive status-quo, praxis-reinforcing sense. The text of At Swim-Two-Birds, 
by contrast, serves no such ideological purpose. This bulky thing, this “novel,” if 
novel it is, does not do (change, motivate, [re]present, project) anything (simply). 
The “novel” is woven together with a nonsensical number of strands — mythic, 
folkloric, and contemporary (circa 1939) — and can, by no means, be thought of as 
an integrated whole. The “Author” himself — otherwise known as Flann O’Brien, 
Brian O’Nolan, or Myles na gCopaleen — needed assistance in editing this con-
fusing sheaf of odds and ends. “O’Brien” did not abstract himself from the world 
and begin the god-like task of isolating, cutting, sorting “his” text, but remained at 
the level of that text, leaving his “work” a jumble of relations — a jumble that the 
mildly baroque prose of this paragraph can only gesture toward.
At Swim is, then, a democratic text which does not attempt to assimilate 
otherness to itself, to a Babel-like category, project, or narrative. It is a mortal text 
that shows its face and is happy to do so. This confusion in happiness and hap-
piness in confusion confronts each reader with the possibility that, maybe, this 
text’s confusion should not be rationalized — should not (and cannot) be made 
sensible. What the reader and critic of O’Brien’s text realizes is that he or she is 
also a text, constituted through a series of acts that are only slightly dissimilar to 
Trellis’s “aestho-autogamy” (55). Birth is messy, impure, sordid, entirely artificial, 
and impossible to wrap one’s mind around. If each “I” is so complexly woven, so 
subject to others, any hope for a panoptical assimilation of an outside reality, its 
others, and its texts, can be seen only for what it is, a morbid joke.
O’Brien’s At Swim does reveal the “fiction” of the colonial panopticon’s gods by 
inscribing them into the same circle as the colonized. Separate from their divine 
technology, they are finite and mortal once again. Writing is seen for what it is, 
the torturous, arbitrary, power-inscribed act of creating an another’s identity — an 
act that will remain totalitarian as long as one side possesses a larger arsenal of 
publishing houses and the technology upon which they depend. This is true, yes, 
to some extent. However, it is not enough to know that the panoptical position 
is a fiction of God (Bozovic 11). Analysis, of the traditional sort, will recapitulate 
114 Journal of Modern Literature Volume 31, Number 2
the same oppressive structure. Rationality, after all, operates in a panoptical man-
ner, assimilating confusion to a unitary world view and feeding off of a simple 
oppositional agency.
O’Brien’s text, however, glories in formally undermining clear oppositions. At 
the very moment that one comes close to solidifying an opposition or a reading, 
one or another ontological level of the text slips and careens into another, leaving 
its readers both smiling and shrugging. This happiness in confusion and confusion 
in happiness inexorably resists its readers and their analyses; the question is whether 
we as readers have the ontological and hermeneutic nimbleness to be just to the 
profusion of “authors” which is/are Flann O’Brien, Brian O’Nolan, and Myles na 
gCopaleen.
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